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Role of Regulation in Minimizing Terrorist Threats
Against the Food Supply: Information, Incentives,
and Penalties
Michael T. Roberts*
I. INTRODUCTION
Ringing alarm bells as he announced his resignation as
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services,
Tommy Thompson posited: “I, for the life of me, cannot
understand why the terrorists have not . . . attacked our food
supply because it is so easy to do.” 1 The seeming ease of a
terrorist attack on the United States food supply evokes the
obvious question of what steps should be taken to minimize the
threat.
Determining what steps should be taken and
implementing those steps naturally turns our attention to the
government’s important role in protecting the safety of the
nation’s food supply from terrorist attacks.
The government’s role in protecting the safety of the
nation’s food supply has historically depended on two factors:
first, incremental legislation and regulation in response to
specific problems, and second, effective coordination and
cooperation among regulatory authorities and other public and
private stakeholders. These factors remain the same even
when the government is responding to terrorist threats against
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1. Mike Allen, Rumsfeld to Remain at Pentagon; Thompson Quits HHS,
Warns of Vulnerabilities, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2004, at A1.
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the food supply. While the government has passed legislation
and has taken specific steps to minimize the threat of food
terrorism, it also relies upon a food regulatory system
dependent upon effective cooperation and coordination among
public and private stakeholders. 2
Measuring the effectiveness of the government’s response
to the threat of food terrorism is not easy. Much has been
written about the role of government regulation in reducing
health risks. 3 Rather than devise a regulatory construct
specifically to address the threat of food terrorism, this article
evaluates the government’s efforts, within the existing
regulatory construct, to minimize the risk of food terrorism by
focusing on the effectiveness of the government’s use of three
regulatory tools: information, incentives, and penalties. This
article concludes that there are inherent limitations and
weaknesses of the food regulatory system.
II. SETTING THE TABLE
It has long been recognized that the government is
responsible for ensuring the safety of the food supply. 4 This
responsibility stems from the government’s overall role in
protecting the public health. 5 This role is buttressed by rulings
from the Supreme Court pronouncing that the preservation of
public health is the most important duty of the state as a
sovereign power. 6 Since September 11, 2001, this role has
focused more sharply on abating the threat of terrorist activity
against the nation’s food supply. 7
2. See Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet:
Strengthening the Security of Our Nation’s Food Supply (July 6, 2004),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0453.shtm.
3. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD
EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993) (exploring the difficulties that plague the
efforts of government regulation to reduce health risk and proposing a new,
centralized agency); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND
THE ENVIRONMENT (2002) (employing cost-benefit analysis to addressing
government regulation to protect safety and the environment).
4. PETER BARTON HUTT & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD & DRUG LAW 1
(1991).
5. See generally Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the "Old" Public
Health: The Legal Framework for the Regulation of Public Health 1-4 (John M.
Olin Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 170, 2002), available at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/WkngPprs_151-175/170-rae.old-publichealth.pdf (describing governmental public health approaches).
6. See Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
7. JIM MONKE, AGROTERRORISM: THREATS AND PREPAREDNESS CRS-1
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A. DEFINING FOOD TERRORISM
“Food terrorism” is defined, by a World Health
Organization (WHO) report, as “an act or threat of deliberate
contamination of food for human consumption with chemical,
biological or radionuclear agents for the purpose of causing
injury or death to civilian populations and/or disrupting social,
In a similar vein, a
economic, or political stability.” 8
Congressional Research Service report to Congress defines
“agroterrorism” as “the deliberate introduction of an animal or
plant disease with the goal of generating fear, causing economic
losses, and/or undermining stability.” 9
Historically, food terrorism includes the deliberate
sabotage of military and civilian food supplies, primarily during
military campaigns, via the intentional contamination of food
by chemical, biological, or radionuclear agents. 10 More recent
non-military examples include the Rajneeshee cult, which
contaminated Oregon salad bars with Salmonella typhimurium
in an attempt to influence a local election in 1984. 11 In 1996 a
disgruntled laboratory worker infected food with Shigella
dysenteria type two. 12 Attacks against agriculture also have a
long history, with many countries developing agricultural
bioweapons programs during the twentieth century. 13
The WHO report demonstrates the potential impact of food
terrorism on human health by extrapolating from numerous
documented examples of unintentional outbreaks of food borne
disease. 14 In the United States, these include a 1985 outbreak
of Salmonella typhimurium infection that affected 170,000
people, caused by contamination of pasteurized milk from a
(Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for Congress Order Code RL32521, Aug.
13, 2004), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32521.pdf.
8. FOOD SAFETY DEP’T, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, TERRORIST
THREATS TO FOOD: GUIDANCE FOR ESTABLISHING AND STRENGTHENING
PREVENTION
AND
RESPONSE
SYSTEMS
4
(2002),
available
at
http://www.who.int/foodsafety/publications/general/en/terrorist.pdf.
9. MONKE, supra note 7, at CRS-1.
10. See FOOD SAFETY DEP’T, supra note 8.
11. PETER CHALK, HITTING AMERICA’S SOFT UNDERBELLY:
THE
POTENTIAL THREAT OF DELIBERATE BIOLOGICAL ATTACKS AGAINST THE U.S.
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD INDUSTRY 29 (2004). See also FOOD SAFETY DEP’T.,
supra note 8, at 5.
12. See CHALK, supra note 11, at 29.
13. MONKE, supra note 7, at CRS-5.
14. FOOD SAFETY DEP’T, supra note 8, at 5.
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dairy plant and a 1994 outbreak of Salmonella enteritidis
infection that affected 224,000 people in forty-one states,
caused by contaminated pasteurized liquid ice cream. The ice
cream was contaminated via the inadvertent contamination of
the pre-mix in tanker trucks. 15 Aside from the human health
toll, the potential impact of food terrorism on the social,
economic, and political stability of the United States is
enormous. 16
B. UNDERSTANDING THE FOOD SUPPLY SYSTEM
Two aspects of the U.S. food supply system make it
difficult to minimize acts or threats of deliberate
contamination. First, the food supply system encompasses a
multi-faceted production and delivery system of food products,
commonly referred to as a “farm-to-table” or “farm-to-plate”
system. 17 Essential system components include the production,
processing, preparing, packaging, labeling, distribution, and, of
course, consumption of food. 18 At each of these stages, food
products may be exposed to various levels of risk. 19 Food can
be contaminated deliberately by chemical, biological, or
radionuclear agents at any stage of the food supply system. 20
The complexity of this system renders it difficult for a
regulatory system to address the numerous risk points. 21
Second, the food supply system is increasingly global. 22
Food is the subject of an international distribution chain that
involves a wide variety of entities from small local companies to
multinational companies, from exporters to retailers. 23 Much

15. Id.
16. CHALK, supra note 11, at 4, 19-26.
17. See Robert V. Tauxe, Linking Illnesses to Foods: A Conceptual
Framework, in TOWARD SAFER FOOD: PERSPECTIVES ON RISK AND PRIORITY
SETTING 47 (Sandra A. Hoffman & Michael R. Taylor, eds., 2005).
18. See INST. OF MEDICINE & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENSURING SAFE
FOOD FROM PRODUCTION TO CONSUMPTION 25 (1998).
19. See Tauxe, supra note 17, at 47 (“[t]he issue is complex: there are
many chemical and biological hazards, many foods, and many points from
farm to table at which microbes or other hazards can enter foods, and where
microbes can multiply or be eliminated.”).
20. FOOD SAFETY DEP’T, supra note 8, at 11.
21. See generally INST. OF MEDICINE & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra
note 18, at 25-49 (overview of the complex, current U.S. food safety system).
22. See Anita Regmi & Mark Gehlhar, Processed Food Trade Pressured by
Evolving Global Supply Chains, AMBER WAVES (Feb. 2005).
23. See id.
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of this international development is driven by consumers who
increasingly demand various types of food year-round. 24 A
global food supply system renders governance difficult where
national regulatory regimes approach regulation differently
and where these regimes are limited in ensuring the safety of
food produced and processed beyond national borders. 25
Considering the complexities and broad scope of the food
supply system, the role of protecting food from acts or threats of
deliberate contamination is daunting.
For example, the
contamination of food in one country can directly affect health
in other parts of the world. 26 In 1989, staphylococcal food
poisoning in the United States was caused by mushrooms
canned in China. 27 In 1996 and 1997, cyclosporiasis outbreaks
in the United States were linked to consumption of
Guatemalan raspberries. 28 A more recent example is the 2003
outbreak of hepatitis in Pennsylvania, North Carolina,
Tennessee, and Georgia caused by green onions imported from
Mexico. 29
III. RESPONSE OF U.S. FOOD REGULATORY SYSTEM TO
TERRORISM
A. FOOD SAFETY REGULATORY SYSTEM
The existing United States food regulatory system has
developed piecemeal over the last century, generating new
rules and regulations in response to emerging food problems. 30
As a result, the regulatory system is complicated and plagued
by gaps, overlaps, and inconsistencies. 31 Its fragmented legal
24. See Michael R. Taylor, Lead or React? A Game Plan for Modernizing
the Food Safety System in the United States, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 399, 400
(2004).
25. See Caroline Smith DeWaal, Rising Imports, Bioterrorism, and the
Food Supply, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 433, 438-39 (2004).
26. FOOD SAFETY DEP’T, supra note 8, at 5.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 5-6.
29. See LINDA CALVIN ET AL., ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, U. S. DEP’T
OF AGRIC., THE ECONOMICS OF FOOD SAFETY: THE CASE OF GREEN ONIONS
AND
HEPATITIS
A
OUTBREAK,
(Dec.
2004),
available
at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/vgs/nov04/VGS30501/VGS30501.pdf.
30. Timothy M. Hammonds, It Is Time to Designate a Single Food Safety
Agency?, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 427, 427 (2004).
31. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), GAO-04-588T, FEDERAL
FOOD SAFETY AND SECURITY SYSTEM: FUNDAMENTAL RESTRUCTURING IS
NEEDED TO ADDRESS FRAGMENTATION AND OVERLAP 2-3 (March 2004),
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and organizational structure allocates to various government
agencies
differing
responsibilities
for
specific
food
commodities. 32 The numbers tell the story. The safety and
quality of the food supply is governed by thirty principal laws
administered by fifteen agencies, 33 twenty-eight House and
Senate subcommittees that oversee food safety, 34 and more
than eighty-five state and 3,000 local regulatory agencies that
license and inspect retail food establishments under various
state laws and regulations. 35
Within this system the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) and the United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA) have most of the regulatory responsibilities. 36 The
FDA has jurisdiction over all “food” under the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 37 The USDA, through its Food Safety
and Inspection Service (FSIS) agency, has jurisdiction over
products containing more than “small amounts” of meat,
poultry, and processed egg products under the Federal Meat
Inspection Act and Poultry Products Inspection Act. 38 The
USDA, through its other agencies, also has jurisdiction over the
primary agriculture production.
The legal standards promulgated under this federal system
include two basic standards: food must not be adulterated or
misbranded. 39 This means that food products must be safe and
the labeling of food products must not be false or misleading.
The regulatory driver for food safety standards for both
FDA and USDA has been a collective group of regulations
called “good manufacturing practices” (GMPs). GMPs are
standards that were adopted as regulations for food processing
and handling following consultations with industry, experts,
the public, and other interested parties and after rigorous
available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d04588t.pdf.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 2.
34. INST. OF MEDICINE & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 18, at 26.
35. DONNA U. VOGT, FOOD SAFETY ISSUES IN THE 109TH CONGRESS CRS-11
(Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for Congress Order Code RL31853, Feb. 4,
2005), available at http://kuhl.house.gov/UploadedFiles/foodsafety.pdf.
36. GAO FEDERAL FOOD SAFETY, supra note 31, at 3.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 331(b) (2000);
Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 602 (2000); Poultry Products
Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 452; Egg Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 1032
(2000).
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notice and comment periods. 40 In the 1990s, the FDA and the
USDA also adopted a preventive approach to ensure the safety
of food called the “Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point”
(HACCP) system. 41 As a uniform science-based approach to
food safety, HACCP is predicated upon seven basic principles
and applies a technical analysis of the food production process
carried out by the food plant itself. 42
Despite the seeming simplicity of the legal standards
governing the food supply, the respective regulatory approaches
of the USDA and the FDA are markedly divergent. 43 The
USDA’s regulatory approach is predicated upon continuous
The FDA’s regulatory
inspection and prior approval. 44
approach is predicated upon random inspection and
Also, the USDA
enforcement in the marketplace. 45
traditionally has had more enforcement authority and
resources than the FDA. 46 Much has also been made of the
different food safety philosophies of the FDA and the USDA. 47
In their frequent plant inspections, USDA inspectors use sight,
smell, and touch to detect food safety problems. 48 In contrast,
FDA inspectors rarely inspect food facilities and focus more on
evaluating the entire food production process within an
establishment. 49 There is also the problem of demarcating the
regulatory authority of these two agencies for food facilities and
food products that fall under the jurisdiction of both agencies.
Famous examples include pizza and soup products, both of
which contain ingredients that may fall under the jurisdiction
of either the FDA or multiple USDA agencies. 50 Another
classic example is the deli whose closed-face and open-face
sandwiches may be regulated by the FDA and the USDA,
respectively. 51
40. VOGT, supra note 35, at 7.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See GAO FEDERAL FOOD SAFETY, supra note 31, at 3.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See Robin J. Strongin, How Vulnerable Is the Nation’s Food Supply?
Linking Food Safety and Food Security, NAT’L HEALTH POL’Y FORUM, MAY 17,
2002, at 5, available at http://www.nhpf.org/pdfs_ib/IB773_FoodSafety_5-1702.pdf.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See GAO FEDERAL FOOD SAFETY, supra note 31, at 5.
51. Id. at 7-8.
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Key to effective regulation within this complex and
fragmented food regulatory system is interagency cooperation
and cooperation between these agencies and public and private
stakeholders. Evidence of interagency cooperation is provided
by the more than fifty interagency agreements entered into by
the federal agencies to govern their combined food safety
oversight responsibilities. 52 The FDA and the USDA have
signed several Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) that
encompass dual jurisdiction establishments, food additive
petitions, and others. 53 For years, federal and state agencies
have also coordinated in an effort to protect the food supply. 54
This coordination extends to industry, where trade associations
composed of food producers, processors, ingredient suppliers,
retailers, and service establishments form model policies and
support programs to help members enhance food safety and
Other groups, such as
meet regulatory requirements. 55
consumer organizations, professional organizations, and
academic organizations play important roles in promoting food
safety, researching food safety technology, and in training and
education. 56
B. INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The emergence of the global food system makes the
regulation of food produced, processed, and handled beyond
Three important international
U.S. boundaries critical. 57
considerations stand out: inspecting importation of food
products into the United States, regulating food safety in other
countries, and setting international food safety standards.
The increasing levels of imported foods have severely taxed
the ability of federal agencies to ensure safety. 58 In a March
2004 hearing of the House Appropriation Committee’s

52. Id. at 2.
53. Hearing before the Subcomm. on Civil Serv. and Agency Org. of the H.
Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 108th Cong. (2004) (Statement of Robert E. Brackett,
Ph.D., Dir. of the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition), available at
http://www.fda.gov/ola/2004/foodsafety0330.html.
54. See Stuart M. Pape et al., Food Security Would Be Compromised by
Combining the Food and Drug Administration and the U.S. Department of
Agriculture Into a Single Food Agency, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 405, 414 (2004).
55. INST. OF MEDICINE & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 18, at 31.
56. Id. at 32.
57. See generally id. at 46.
58. See DeWaal, supra note 25, at 436.
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Subcommittee
on
Agriculture,
acting
FDA
Deputy
Commissioner Lester Crawford acknowledged that “[t]he FDA
is overwhelmed by imports, which have increased five-fold
since 1994.” 59 The interdependence of the FDA, the USDA, and
the United States Customs Service created communication
problems and has historically challenged federal efforts to
guard the safety of imported food. 60 For example, food refused
entry by the FDA reportedly may have been allowed into
commerce by the Customs Service. 61
Absent the ability to inspect every single imported food
product, protecting the United States food supply depends on
the safety efforts of other countries. Other countries, including
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom,
have made efforts to reform decentralized and fragmented food
safety systems. 62
In addition to national food safety regimes, various
international bodies set international standards for food safety.
These international organizations include the WHO, which is
actively engaged in numerous food safety initiatives; 63 the Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO),
which serves as a useful gateway to feed and food safety
information; 64 and the Codex Alimentarius Commission, which
as a subsidiary body of the WHO and FAO, develops standards,
codes of practice, and guidelines for food commodities. 65 The
World Trade Organization (WTO), based on the Agreement on
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS

59. See DeWaal, supra note 25, at 436 (quoting Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Agriculture of the H. Comm. On Appropriations, 108th Cong.
(2004) (Statement of Lester M. Crawford, D.V.M., Ph.D., Deputy
Commissioner for the Food and Drug Administration)).
60. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), GAO/T-RCED-98-271,
FOOD SAFETY—WEAK AND INCONSISTENTLY APPLIED CONTROLS ALLOW
UNSAFE IMPORTED FOOD TO ENTER U.S. COMMERCE 7-8 (Sept. 10, 1998),
available at http://www.gao/gov/archive/1998/rc9827t.pdf.
61. See id.
62. See U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), GAO-05-212, FOOD
SAFETY: EXPERIENCES OF SEVEN COUNTRIES IN CONSOLIDATING THEIR FOOD
SAFETY
SYSTEMS
(Feb.
2005),
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05212.pdf.
63. See
World
Health
Organization,
Food
Safety,
http://www.who.int/topics/food_safety/en/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2006).
64. See Food and Agriculture Organization, Feed and Food Safety
Gateway, http://www.fao.org/ag/aga/agap/frg/Feedsafety/feedsafety.htm (last
visited Oct. 9, 2006).
65. See
Codex
Alimentarius,
http://www.codexalimentarius.net/web/index_en.jsp (last visited Oct. 9 2006).
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Agreement), resolves trade disputes that involve food safety
issues, such as the regulation of hormone use in cattle. 66
C. RECENT REGULATION IN RESPONSE TO FOOD TERRORIST
THREATS
Consistent with historical patterns of response to food
crises, the federal government has responded to threats of food
terrorism by enacting new food law to be applied and enforced
within the established food regulatory system.
Recent
regulation has, to a limited extent, altered the United States
food regulatory system by shifting some power from the states
to the federal government, granting additional authority to
federal agencies, particularly to the FDA, and realigning and
reassigning regulatory authority, particularly from the USDA
to the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Despite
these changes, however, interagency cooperation and
collaboration among stakeholders remains central to the
regulatory role in minimizing the threat of terrorist activity
against the food supply.
1. Bioterrorism Act
The emerging regulation is largely encompassed in the
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act of 2002 (Bioterrorism Act). 67 The Bioterrorism
Act has four major provisions related to food. The first is the
food facility registration requirement, which requires domestic
and foreign facilities that manufacture, process, produce, pack,
or hold food for human or animal consumption in the United
Registering elicits
States to register with the FDA. 68
information about the food products (brand names and general
food categories), facility addresses, and contact information. 69
The second major provision is the establishment and
maintenance of records, which requires firms to keep records of

66. See World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/ (last visited Oct. 9,
2006).
67. See Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188 (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
68. See Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security
and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,894
(Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20).
69. See id.
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all foods they receive and release. 70 These records include
information regarding the identity of the food, the immediate
supplier of the food, and the immediate consumer of the food. 71
While federal statutes have allowed FSIS to inspect slaughter
and processing plant records, FDA has never before had the
authority to require food processors to keep records or the
ability to inspect them. 72 In the event there is a suspected food
safety problem, the Bioterrorism Act gives FDA access to
records including the name and address of facilities’ immediate
supplier and customer.
The third major provision of the Bioterrorism Act is the
prior notice requirement for imported food shipments, which
requires that entities provide prior notice of all foods for human
or animal consumption before they enter the United States. 73
Prior notice helps FDA assess whether a shipment will trigger
an inspection. 74
The fourth major provision is administrative detention,
which provides procedures for the seizure of foods meant for
animal or human consumption. 75
These provisions were created largely in response to the
limited scope of FDA’s authority and are geared toward food
processors and importers. 76
2. Homeland Security Act
Another important law is the Homeland Security Act. 77
70. See Establishment and Maintenance of Records Under the Public
Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 69
Fed. Reg. 71,561-62 (Dec. 9, 2004) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 11)
(hereinafter Establishment and Maintenance of Records). See also Michael T.
Roberts & Margie Alsbrook, United States Food Law Update, 1 J. FOOD L. &
POL’Y 187, 199-201 (2005) (generally describing the record-keeping rule).
71. See Establishment and Maintenance of Records, supra note 70.
72. Vogt, supra note 35, at CRS-16.
73. See Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public Health Security
and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,974
(Oct. 10, 2002) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1).
74. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., HHS
Issues New Rules to Enhance Security of the U.S. Food Supply (Oct. 9, 2003),
available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2003pres/20031009.html.
75. Administrative Detention of Food for Human or Animal Consumption
Under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act of 2002, 69 Fed. Reg. 31,660 (June 4, 2004) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. pt. 1, 10, 16).
76. Joseph A. Levitt, CFSAN’s Program Priorities: From Food Safety to
Food Security, 58 FOOD AND DRUG L.J. 19, 24 (2003).
77. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 101(a)-101(b),
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This Act created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
and transferred parts of many agencies to the new DHS. 78 For
example, agriculture border inspections were transferred from
the USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(APHIS) agency to DHS. 79 Section 421 of the Homeland
Security Act authorized the transfer of up to 3,200 APHIS
border inspection personnel to DHS. 80 As of March 1, 2003,
approximately 2,680 APHIS inspectors became employees of
DHS in the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP).
The USDA retained a significant presence in border inspection
and management of data collected during the inspection
APHIS also
process because of its scientific expertise. 81
conducts off-shore, pre-clearance inspections at the port of
origin. 82
3. Presidential Directives
Following the creation of DHS, President Bush issued a
series of directives known as “Homeland Security Presidential
Directives” (HSPD). 83 The first of these directives, HSPD-5,
directs DHS to coordinate development of the new National
Response Plan that incorporates national prevention,
preparedness, response, and recovery plans into a single, allhazard plan. 84 “HSPD-7 defines USDA and HHS as ‘sectorspecific agencies’ with responsibilities for securing the
agriculture and food sectors.” 85 HSPD-8 sets out a national
preparedness goal for all hazards, including agriculture. 86 The
most important directive, HSPD-9, instructs the heads of DHS,
USDA, HHS, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the
Justice Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
to coordinate their efforts to prepare for, protect against,
116 Stat. 2135, 2142 (2002).
78. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-609, at 63-64 (2002) (combining twenty-two
agencies into a single Department of Homeland Security).
79. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, supra note 77, § 421.
80. Id.
81. Monke, supra note 7, at CRS-12.
82. Id.
83. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), GAO-05-214,
HOMELAND SECURITY—MUCH IS BEING DONE TO PROTECT AGRICULTURE
FROM A TERRORIST ATTACK, BUT IMPORTANT CHALLENGES REMAIN 13 (Mar.
2005).
84. Id. at 19-20.
85. Id. at 20.
86. Id.
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respond to, and recover from an agro-terrorist attack. 87 The
features of HSPD-9 include an integrated diagnostic system,
animal and commodity tracking systems, vulnerability
assessments, and coordination with academic communities at
federal, state, and local levels for capacity-building grants. 88 It
is important to note that HSPD-9 did not create enforceable
laws. 89 Moreover, the viability of HSPD-9 is dependent on
federal appropriations. 90
4. Additional Regulation
Additional regulation germane to minimizing the threat of
food terrorism includes a final rule by APHIS, effective March
18, 2005, that places additional requirements on laboratory
facilities that possess, use, transfer, or receive select agents
capable of causing substantial harm to human, plant, or animal
health. 91
Similarly, the FDA enacted a feed ban to ensure protection
against bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). In October
2005, the FDA published a proposed feed-ban rule to amend the
agency’s regulations to prohibit the use of cattle origin
BSE is
materials in the food or feed of all animals. 92
transmitted to cattle when cattle eat BSE-infected tissue. The
proposed rule is intended to shore up the FDA regulatory
protection by keeping the BSE-causing agent out of the animal
food and feed supply. 93
Additionally, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) 94
acts as a federal “backstop” for certain acts of terrorism via a
federal program that distributes the risk of loss from foreign
terrorist attacks between the federal government and the

87. See Press Release, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-9
(Jan.
30,
2004),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040203-2.html.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002: Possession, Use,
and Transfer of Biological Agents and Toxins, 70 Fed. Reg. 13,242 (March 18,
2005) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 331 and 9 C.F.R. pt. 121).
92. Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed, 70 Fed. Reg.
58,570 (proposed Oct. 6, 2005) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 589).
93. See id. at 58,579-80; see also Press Release, FDA, FDA News: FDA
Proposes Additional “Mad Cow” Safeguards (Oct. 4, 2005), available at
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2005/new01240.html.
94. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, §
108(a), 116 Stat. 2322 (2002).
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insurance industry. 95 For the Terrorism Risk Insurance to
apply, terrorist events must meet certain criteria. 96
5. Agency Action
These laws, regulations, and executive actions are
significant and contribute to efforts to abate the concern of food
terrorism. There is also an impressive “cooperative” regulatory
food-safety system that has evolved over time. Hence, it is no
surprise that the federal regulatory agencies, state agencies,
the private sector, and the academic community have joined
together in a collaborative effort on various fronts to reduce the
threat of food terrorism. 97
Federal food agencies participate with other agencies and
coordinate activities through the HHS Secretary’s Command
Center. 98 Interagency efforts at this level include agencies
such as the DHS, the USDA, the FDA, the CIA, the Federal
Bureau of Investigations (FBI), and others. 99 Interagency
conference calls and meetings help facilitate communication
and collaboration. 100
Coordination has resulted in a number of new
organizations geared toward addressing the threat of food
terrorism. A sampling of these organizations includes:
● The USDA Office of Food Security and Emergency
Preparedness
Response,
which
coordinates
the

95. Nat’l Assoc. of Mfrs, Terrorism Risk Insurance, available at
http://www.nam.org/s_nam/sec.asp?CID=202306&DID=234654.
96. Mass. Office of Consumer Affairs and Business Regulation, Terrorism
Risk
Insurance
Act
of
2002
FAQs,
http://www.mass.gov/?pageID=ocaterminal&&L=5&L0=Home&L1=Business&
L2=Insurance&L3=Commercial+Buyers&L4=Terrorism+Coverage&sid=Eoca
&b=terminalcontent&f=_doi_Commercial_Comm_Terr_RiskIns&csid=Eoca
(last visited Jan. 23, 2007).
97. See Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet:
Strengthening the Security of our Nation’s Food Supply, available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0453.shtm.
98. See Hearing before the Subcomm. on Civil Serv. and Agency Org. of the
H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 108th Cong. (2004) (Statement of Robert E.
Brackett, Ph.D., Dir. of the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition),
available at http://www.fda.gov/ola/2004/foodsafety0330.html.
99. See Hearing before the Subcomm. on Research, Nutrition, and Gen.
Legislation of the S. Comm. on Agric., Nutrition, and Forestry, 109th Cong.
(2006) (Statement of Alex M. Azar, J.D., Deputy Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of
Health
and
Human
Servs.),
available
at
http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/t060109.html.
100. See id.
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development of infrastructure and capacity for the
department to prevent, prepare for, and respond to food
terrorist attacks. 101
● The FDA’s Center for Food Safety and Applied
Nutrition’s (CFSAN) Office of Food Safety, Defense, and
Outreach (OFSDO), which disseminates food safety and
food defense information to federal partners, state and
local governments, industry, and consumers. 102
● The USDA steering committee, which develops a
National Veterinary Stockpile. 103
● The Food Emergency Response Network (FERN)
established by the FDA and the FSIS. 104 It integrates
state and federal laboratories to analyze food samples
implicated in threats, terrorist events, or contamination. 105
● The FDA Office of Crisis Management (OCM), which
coordinates preparedness and emergency response
activities within the FDA and with federal, state, and local
counterparts. 106
Coordination has also led to initiatives involving federal
agencies and private stakeholders, including the following:
● An FDA and USDA initiative called the Strategic
Partnership Program Agroterrorism (SPPA), designed to
conduct vulnerability assessments in the private sector
with the CARVER + Shock tool. 107 These assessments are
used to develop strategies and countermeasures to reduce
potential threats along the farm-to-table continuum. 108
● Food Security Councils, which represent key components
of the agriculture and food chain, coordinate food defense

101. See Press Release, Homeland Security, supra note 97.
102. See Interview by Alice Sharp with David Acheson, Director, Office of
Food Safety, Defense and Outreach, Getting It Out There, FOOD SAFETY,
available at http://www.gdspublishing.com/ic_pdf/usfs/ofsdo.pdf (last visited
Mar. 7, 2007).
103. See GAO HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 83, at 5.
104. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Food Emergency Response Network – FERN
(Fiscal
Year
2005),
available
at
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/About_FSIS/Cooperative_Agreements_FERN_2005/in
dex.asp.
105. Vogt, supra note 35, at CRS-17.
106. Id.
107. U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Strategic Partnership Program
Agroterrorism
(SPPA)
Initiative,
(Aug.
2005),
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~dms/agroterr.html.
108. See Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, SPPA Questions
and Answers (Sept. 23, 2005), http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~dms/agroter4.html.
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efforts. 109
● HHS, USDA and joint laboratory networks, which work
to enhance diagnostic and monitoring capabilities. 110
● Agency-created working groups that fund research to
address a range of issues. 111
● FDA and USDA guidance documents issued to
producers, processors, transporters, distributors, and
consumers to minimize the risk of food terrorism. 112
Partnerships by government agencies have also been
entered into with academic institutions for food safety centers
addressing food terrorist threats, including the following: 113
● The University of Minnesota led Homeland Security
National Center for Food Protection and Defense, which
works with academia, industry, and government to
address food defense issues. 114
● Texas A&M University Homeland Security National
Center for Foreign Animal and Zoonotic Disease Defense,
which works with academia, industry, and government to
address potential threats to animal agriculture. 115
Coordination has involved federal agencies with states at
various levels, including the following.
● A DHS award was given to Iowa to establish a multistate partnership in the development of food security
planning initiatives and security strategies to be used as
guidelines and models for state and local governments. 116
● The USDA created sixteen Area and Regional
Emergency Coordinator Positions to help states develop
emergency response plans and serve as a technical
resource for states and industry. 117
● The Government Coordinating Council, a federally led
joint federal-state food and agriculture sector team acts as
a counterpart to the industry Sector Coordinating Council

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Press Release, Homeland Security, supra note 97.
See GAO HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 83, at 5.
Id.
See Press Release, Homeland Security, supra note 97.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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to improve communications and coordination. 118
● Efforts by USDA and state departments of agriculture
have expedited the planning for a National Animal
Identification System. 119
● The USDA National Surveillance Unit within APHIS’s
Veterinary Services program serves as a focal point for the
collection, processing, and delivery of surveillance
information. 120
IV. EVALUATION OF GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO FOOD
TERRORISM
One way of evaluating the effectiveness of this hodgepodge
of new legislation, executive action, and agency coordination is
to assess its delivery of information, incentives, and penalties.
This evaluative approach provides an analytical framework
from which to gauge the government’s response.
This
evaluation is squared with issues concerning the structure of
the food regulatory system; a critical inquiry then arises as to
whether the structure is sufficient to minimize the threat of
food terrorism.
A. INFORMATION
Information is necessary to assess risk, identify problems,
facilitate coordination, and incorporate traceability capability
in the multifaceted global food supply and distribution chain.
Conveying information concerning food terrorism is also
essential to building and maintaining public trust with
government. A fragmented food regulatory system renders the
gathering and application of information especially challenging.
Measuring the use of information as a tool raises several
issues. What types of information are needed? How much
information is needed? Who has access to the information?
What is the information used for? What is the cost of gathering
the information? These questions are particularly important
because irrelevant or inadequate information may generate
inadequate or even excessive demands for regulation.
The specific food-defense information tools used by
government agencies include the essential prongs of the
Bioterrorism Act: registration, recordkeeping, import notice

118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id.
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and inspection. These tools enable government agencies to
obtain information concerning the supply chain. Collaborative
efforts by agencies are also designed to obtain and share
information. The gathering of this information has helped
build a more accurate inventory of food distribution and
enhanced capability to identify and trace food problems. This
is especially important given the complex nature of the food
production and delivery system.
There are, however, limits to the Bioterrorism Act’s ability
to gather information. The Act limits access regarding trade
Also,
secrets and confidential business information. 121
registration information and information collected under the
Bioterrorism Act regarding the location of food supplies to
prevent intentional or unintentional contamination is protected
from public disclosure by the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA). 122
Other information-gathering limitations may not make as
much sense. For example, several entities are exempt from the
registration requirements, namely certain retail stores, nonprofit food and feeding establishments, fishing vessels, trucks,
and other motor carriers. 123 Do these exemptions make sense?
A farm may pack or hold food without losing its exemption, so
long as the food is grown, raised, or consumed on that farm or
another under the same ownership. 124 However, if a farm
packs or holds a neighboring farm’s products, then the farm
facility must register. 125 Does it make sense for registration
requirements for farms to be predicated upon ownership? Are
not non-profit food establishments less of a target for
terrorists?
Also of concern are gaps in security at food-processing
facilities, as reported by a General Accounting Office (GAO)
121. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2002).
122. Michael T. Roberts & Doug O'Brien, Animal Identification:
Confidentiality
of
Information
(Fall
2004),
http://lmic.info/memberspublic/animalID/fs05.pdf.
123. See Vogt, supra note 35, at CRS-14.
124. Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,894,
58,905 (Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20) (supplementary
information).
125. See id. at 58,905-06 (explaining that a packing shed that packs food
grown or raised on several farms under different ownership is not covered by
the "farm" definition; thus, such a shed must register) (supplementary
information).
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report. 126 The report finds that “federal food safety statutes
provide FDA and USDA with broad authority to regulate the
safety of the United States food supply but do not specifically
authorize them to impose security requirements at foodprocessing facilities.” 127 The report notes that oversight of
these facilities is governed by voluntary guidelines. 128 As
stated by the report, the government instructs inspectors not to
enforce implementation of security measures or document any
observations because of the possible release of information
under FOIA and potential misuse of the information. 129 If
security gaps at food-processing facilities were made public,
terrorists could use them as a road map for terrorist activity. 130
The extent of the adoption of voluntary guidelines is
unknown. 131 The report acknowledges that according to trade
association officials, food processors are voluntarily taking
steps, including many of the measures suggested by the FDA
and the FSIS, such as installing fences, requiring that
employees wear identification, and restricting access to certain
plant areas. 132
Another GAO report noted problems with coordination and
communication. The report points to the DHS’s lack of
coordination of federal working groups and research efforts. 133
The same report notes the lack of integration of agencies’
diagnostic laboratory networks. This could lead to the HHS not
receiving timely information from the USDA on agricultural
diseases that could spread to humans. 134 Communication
problems cited in the report include the limited flow of critical
information among key stakeholders, such as between the DHS
and key agriculture states and industry representatives,
leading to unclear expectations, a lack of clear understanding of
initiatives in place, and a duplication of efforts. 135
Finally, there is also the consideration of alignment. It

126. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), GAO-03-342, FOODPROCESSING SECURITY: VOLUNTARY EFFORTS ARE UNDER WAY, BUT FEDERAL
AGENCIES CANNOT FULLY ASSESS THEIR IMPLEMENTATION (Feb. 2003).
127. Id. at 3.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 4.
131. Id. at 15.
132. Id.
133. See GAO HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 83, at 8.
134. Id. at 9.
135. Id. at 7-8.

ROBERTS M. Role of Regulation in Minimizing Terrorist Threats Against the Food Supply:
Information, Incentives, and Penalties. MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2006;8(1):199-223.

218

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 8:1

does not necessarily follow that creating a record-keeping
burden leads to facilities being better prepared to respond to a
terrorist activity. The information certainly is beneficial to
managing the food system as a whole, but focusing on
gathering information at the expense of implementing safety
measures is shortsighted.
B. INCENTIVES
In addition to information, incentives are necessary to help
motivate the food industry to adopt and employ security
measures to reduce risk of harm from terrorist attacks and to
encourage cooperation among stakeholders. Measuring the
effectiveness of incentives raises several questions. What are
the best types of incentives? How effective are the incentives?
Are there enough incentives? Is there too much reliance on
incentives?
Are the incentives aligned with the goal of
minimizing terrorist threats? What are the costs of incentives?
Although the Bioterrorism Act does include a series of
grants and incentives to help develop vaccines and antidotes to
protect food supply, livestock, and crops, the focus of the Act,
and the existing food regulatory system, is not on the
development of incentives. A dearth of regulator-sponsored
incentives, however, does not mean that the incentives for
abating food terrorism are lacking. Indeed, the fragmented
regulatory approach to food safety constitutes the overarching
incentive for action. Government agencies and public and
private stakeholders work together because there is no other
option short of restructuring the regulatory agencies if the goal
is to minimize the threat of terrorist activity against the food
supply. Moreover, the self-interest of the food industry drives
it to cooperate with government agencies in order to protect
brand image, limit liability, and avoid penalties. It stands to
reason, therefore, that the Bioterrorism Act’s record keeping
requirements can be good for business because it can lead to
smaller food recalls, which limits liability exposure.
Should good governance rely on the good will of regulators
to shore up the regulatory gaps and on the self-interest of
industry? Answering this question requires consideration of
the moral hazard problem. 136 The primary concern is that
136. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CONG. OF THE U.S., HOMELAND SECURITY
THE
PRIVATE
SECTOR
18
(Dec.
2004)
available
at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/60xx/doc6042/12-20-HomelandSecurity.pdf.

AND
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“[b]usinesses would be inclined to spend less on security than
might be appropriate for the nation as a whole if they faced
losses from an attack that would be less than the overall losses
for society.” 137 If this is the case, then the gap between private
and public costs of a terrorism event can lead to incomplete
information about the vulnerabilities of the food system and
under-spending on security, especially when there is unequal
access to the same information. 138 Government can help close
the gap by internalizing the cost of security through new
regulations that affect the behavior of the food industry, new
taxes, or penalties. 139 The gap could be further closed by
regulations which finance the food industry’s efforts to provide
better information for making security decisions. These efforts
could ramp up current efforts to involve the food industry in
information collection and dissemination, research and
development, and the provision of additional information on the
risks of attacks and opportunities to reduce risks to the food
system. 140
Enthusiasm for developing incentives to generate and
share additional information should be tempered, however, by
recognizing the risk of giving terrorists access to information.
Plus, not all communication provides a social benefit, as there
may be competitive and even anti-trust concerns in the sharing
of information across the food industry.
In addition to the value of information gathering, the
threat of terrorist activity has underscored the importance of
developing incentives for the food industry to adopt HACCP
The food safety system has not provided
programs. 141
sufficient incentives for food industry to embrace HACCP. 142
Not only does HACCP need to be adopted and utilized more
fully, but HACCP now needs to be adapted to food terrorism
programs especially including those involving the surveillance
of imported foodstuffs. 143 Application will help stakeholders
137. Id. at 2.
138. Id. at 3.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 6.
141. Lester Crawford, Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Food and Drug Admin.,
A Conversation on Food Safety and Global Security, Remarks to the Open
Forum, U.S. Dep’t of State,
(Sept. 6, 2002), available at
http://www.state.gov/s/p/of/proc/tr/13454.htm.
142. See generally Neal D. Fortin, The Hang-Up With HACCP: The
Resistance to Translating Science Into Food Safety Law, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
565 (2003).
143. Crawford, supra note 141.
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focus on the most likely agents and modalities for
accomplishing terrorism through the use of the food supply. 144
Implementing and applying HACCP in this manner will
require extensive cooperation between all relevant food
industry stakeholders and regulators, including other countries
and international organizations. 145
Without unduly burdening the private sector, the
government could develop incentives that either require or
motivate food processors to take safety measures, beginning
with basic physical security steps such as installing fences,
alarms, or outside lighting to improve security.
C. PENALTIES
Penalties are designed to reduce the risk of terrorist
attacks on the food supply by deterring behavior which
increases the risk of terrorist attacks. As with information and
incentives, the use of penalties generates several important
questions. Are the penalties effective? Do the penalties deter
bad behavior? To whom are the penalties geared?
Together, the food regulatory system and new food laws
enacted in response to the threat of food terrorism present a
wide array of enforcement tools for regulatory authorities.
There are several penal tools that are available to the FSIS and
the FDA in varying degree and scope: warning letters, adverse
publicity, injunction, retention, seizure, and criminal
prosecution. 146 “These sanctions are not mutually exclusive
and may build upon one another.” 147 Because the FSIS’s
jurisdiction over meat facilities is built around continuous
inspection, the agency’s summary powers to withdraw
inspection services, condemn foods, and obtain plant records
are as intrusive as those of any government agency over a
private industry sector. The FSIS may also detain product in
the plant, which involves instituting a seizure action
requesting a federal district court to direct a United States
Marshal to take custody of the product.148 The FDA’s authority

144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Michael T. Roberts, Mandatory Recall Authority: A Sensible and
Minimalist Approach to Improving Food Safety, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 563, 567
(2004).
147. Id. at 567-68.
148. Id. at 567 n.46.
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under the Bioterrorism Act to detain food under certain
conditions, namely credible evidence that a shipment presents
a serious threat, is a first for the agency with respect to food. 149
Notwithstanding the broadening of scope of the FDA’s
enforcement authority under the Bioterrorism Act, important
differences between the USDA and the FDA inspection and
enforcement authorities remain. For example, the USDA
corrects problems quickly, whereas the FDA may take longer to
implement change across all regulated facilities. 150 There is
also a discrepancy with respect to imported foods. The USDA
is legally required to inspect certifications from other countries
while the FDA is not. 151
A recurring and divisive debate over food safety is whether
there should be mandatory food recall authority to recall unsafe
food from commerce. Currently, the federal government does
not have the authority to recall unsafe food. Recalls of unsafe
food are conducted voluntarily by food companies and are
monitored by either the FSIS with meat products or the FDA
for other food products. 152 Defenders of this voluntary system
contend that the federal government has sufficient enforcement
authority and that enacting a mandatory recall authority
would undermine the cooperative arrangement that exists
between government and private industry.
The current
“authority” of the government to compel a recall is due to the
implicit threat of adverse publicity. 153 Is this arrangement
enough in light of food terrorism? Should there be a provision
for immediate notice and recall if terrorism is suspected to have
rendered a food product unsafe? If a mandatory food recall was
instituted, appropriate safeguards could be implemented to
prevent regulatory overreach. 154
Other improvements are necessary. As recommended by
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, the FDA
needs to implement enforcement action for non-compliant firms
under the feed ban rules. 155 It is also important to remember

149. See Administrative Detention of Food for Human or Animal
Consumption Under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 69 Fed. Reg. 31,660 (June 4, 2004) (to
be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 10, 16).
150. See generally id.
151. See GAO FEDERAL FOOD SAFETY, supra note 31, at 7.
152. Roberts, supra note 146, at 568.
153. See id.
154. See id. at 577-82.
155. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), GAO-02-183,
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that penalties do not work without funding, which is needed for
increased resources, inspections, and staffing.
V. STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS
An evaluation of the regulatory role of the United States
federal government in minimizing the threat of terrorist
attacks against the food supply also requires an appraisal of
the food regulatory system structure. This appraisal invariably
leads to a debate over whether a single food safety entity
should be created. Proponents of a single food safety agency
argue that the existing system is fragmented and ill-equipped
for meeting the challenges of food safety, including potential
terrorist attacks on the food supply. 156 They assert that a
single agency would be more focused, and that efficiency in
delivering information, incentives, and penalties would be
improved. 157
Opponents of a single food agency believe that the
cooperative system has historically worked well and that
moving from a long, settled system to a new entity would
generate confusion and pose a security threat that would
outweigh any supposed benefits that would accrue with a single
agency. 158 Despite legislative attempts to establish a single
federal food safety agency, it is doubtful that proposed
legislation will gain traction in the near future. 159
If the current fragmented system remains in place, it will
be imperative that interagency cooperation and collaboration
with the various private stakeholders occur at optimal levels.
Otherwise, the problems associated with information
gathering, devising incentives for private industry, and
appropriating meaningful penalties will fail to minimize the
threat of food terrorism. Regulators especially should continue
to work with industry to incorporate considerations of food
terrorism into food safety management programs. Policy
makers should also avoid viewing the Bioterrorism Act as the
MAD COW DISEASE: IMPROVEMENTS IN THE ANIMAL FEED BAN AND OTHER
REGULATORY AREAS WOULD STRENGTHEN U.S. PREVENTION EFFORTS (Jan.
2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02183.pdf.
156. See Hammonds, supra note 30, at 427.
157. See id.
158. See Pape et al., supra note 54, at 405.
159. See GAO FEDERAL FOOD SAFETY, supra note 31, at 17-18 (setting forth
the Bush Administration position in 2002 towards the issue of consolidating
food safety agencies).
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regulatory hammer. While the act gathers useful information
and allows the government to rapidly track food products
implicated in a food-borne outbreak, it will not, nor is it
designed to, deter the intentional contamination of food.
It will also be imperative for regulators to look for ways to
improve their preparation and response initiatives to food
product in a global context. The WHO should be encouraged to
continue its helpful role in disseminating information worldwide to help countries adopt effective domestic regulation and
to cooperate with each other. As a global problem, terrorism
demands global solutions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Examining the regulatory role is critical in responding to
Tommy Thompson’s charge that the food system is easy prey
for a terrorist attack. To be fair, the regulatory response to
threat of food terrorism has been impressive and deserves
recognition. A realistic appraisal of the three regulatory tools—
information, incentives, and penalties—requires, however, an
honest appraisal of the inherent limitations and weaknesses of
the food regulatory system and its dependence on the
cooperation and coordination of all stakeholders.
An honest and useful appraisal of the essential regulatory
tools first raises the question as to the specific purposes for
information, incentives, and penalties. Measuring the
effectiveness of these tools to their specific purposes then helps
identify weaknesses and concerns about not just whether the
tool is effective, but what steps the government could take to
reduce further the threat of terrorism against the food system.
Because these regulatory tools via the Bioterrorism Act
and other government activity are applied and enforced within
a long-established food regulatory system, appraisal of this
system is invariable. This appraisal hinges on whether the
cooperation and collaboration by public agencies and the food
industry that underpins the food regulatory system works.
Some argue that a single food safety agency would be better
equipped to meet the challenges of food terrorism threats.
While minimizing terrorist threats is only part of a larger
debate about the efficacy of a single food agency, the debate at
least helps clarify the reasons for the shortcomings of the
government’s response to terrorist threats against the food
supply.

